In this paper we develop and estimate a behavioral model with boundedly rational investors for the U.S. housing market. There are two groups of investors, fundamentalists and chartists. Fundamentalists expect the house price to revert to its fundamental value based on rents, while chartists extrapolate past price trends. Investors are allowed to switch between groups conditional on recent performance. The estimation results show that fundamentalists and chartists are usually present in the market with roughly equal proportions. From 1992 until 2005, however, the proportion of chartists in the market was substantially above the long-term average, such that the house price level climbed far above its fundamental value. In an out-of-sample assessment the model outperforms competing time-series models and predicts the decline of the housing market from 2006 onwards. Finally, the estimated model generates boom-bust price cycles endogenously.
Introduction
The busting of the housing bubble in the U.S. has often been mentioned as the factor triggering the financial crisis in 2007 and 2008, leading to the most severe recession in the developed world since the Great Depression. By lending to individuals with poor credit scores, the so called sub-prime market, financial institutions and investors in mortgage-backed securities were effectively betting on ever increasing house prices (Gorton, 2009) . In retrospect, the U.S. housing market seems to have been driven by speculation, fueled by moral hazard induced lending, for a prolonged period of time. The housing market may be more vulnerable to inefficiencies and occasional crashes than other markets due to lack of effective short selling mechanisms that prevent bearish investors from participating (Hong and Stein, 2003) . Shiller (1989, 1990) already provided evidence of the inefficiency of the market for single-family homes based on the existence of positive serial correlation in year-to-year changes in prices, and negative serial correlations at lags of two to four years. Englund and Ioannides (1997) provide similar evidence for housing prices in 15 OECD countries.
1 Case and Shiller (1990) also show that future house price changes can be predicted with rents and other lagged fundamental variables. This confirms to the general mean reversion pattern of asset returns found by Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1991) for stocks, bonds, exchange rates, and precious metals.
What may explain this pattern of short-term return momentum and long-term mean reversion ? Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1990) show that interactions between rational investors and noise traders following positive feedback strategies -buy when prices rise, sell when prices fall -can reproduce these stylized facts. De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) show that rational traders in such a model can actually destabilize the market by initially driving up prices beyond fundamentals and then later selling out at even higher prices to the feedback traders. 2 Frankel and Froot (1991) build a similar heterogeneous agent model for the foreign exchange market with trend chasers 1 Levin and Wright (1997) show that past house price changes in the UK forecast future price changes. See also Cho (1996) for a survey on house price dynamics. 2 A more recent paper by Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) shows that bubbles created by noise traders can persist even though rational agents jointly have the ability to correct the mispricing, due to dispersion of opinion among the rational agents about the exact timing of the bubble. In this setting it can also be optimal for rational agents to jump the bandwagon and follow the strategy of the positive feedback traders.
and investors trading on mean reversion to fundamentals, and show that it can generate prolonged periods of overvaluation as observed in practice.
A crucial ingredient of the models of Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990) , Frankel and Froot (1991) , Hommes (1997, 1998) , and others, is the presence of a core of non-rational positive feedback traders -sometimes called chartists -that expect past price changes to continue in the future. Representativeness bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) may explain why investors ignore probability rules and consider recent events to be representative of what to expect in the future (De Bondt, 1993) . Bange (2000) shows that stock portfolio adjustments of individual investors reflect past market movements, consistent with positive feedback trading. In addition, Keim and Madhaven (1995) document momentum trading by institutional investors.
In the housing market Case and Shiller (1988) find that individuals base their expectations largely on past price movements, and not on fundamentals. 3 Other papers show evidence of trend chasing behavior in commercial banks' investments in real estate (Mei and Saunders, 1997) and among professional forecasters of the commercial real estate market (Ling, 2005) . Given the widespread evidence of positive feedback trading among market participants, in this paper we try to improve forecasts for housing market prices by estimating a behavioral heterogeneous agent model with positive feedback traders. The model also takes into account the deviation of the housing price from a rentbased fundamental value, through the expectations of a second group of traders who expect mean-reversion. The development of better forecasts for the housing market is of high importance, in the light of the apparent failure of financial institutions, credit agencies, investors and regulators to predict the recent disastrous housing bubble burst in the U.S.
The contribution of this paper is that we are the first to estimate a behavioral heterogeneous agent model for the housing market. The model includes two types of traders: chartists who are positive feedback traders and fundamentalists who expect mean-reversion to a rent-based fundamental value estimate. Furthermore, the investors can switch between the two groups, depending on recent performance of the two forecasting rules. The behavioral heterogeneous agent model for the housing market directly relates behavioral characteristics of traders at the micro level to the resulting market price at the macro level. We use data on the repeat-sales house price index published by Freddie Mac until 2000, and the S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index from 2000 onwards, together with a compatible index for rents developed by Davis, Lehnert and Martin (2008) . In-sample estimation results indicate that expectations based on short-term momentum and mean reversion to fundamentals can both predict future changes in the U.S. house price index well. The estimated coefficients for the two forecasting rules have signs as predicted by theory.
We find that allowing agents to switch between the two forecasting rules based on recent prediction performance, following Hommes (1997, 1998) the behavioral heterogeneous agent model may be not just of theoretical interest, but also a useful forecasting tool for housing market participants.
Our paper builds on the literature on heterogeneous agent models, following Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990) , Frankel and Froot (1991) and Hommes (1997, 1998) , amongst others. Several studies have shown that these models can replicate many of the well-known stylized facts of financial market data. For example, Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990) show that a model with positive feedback traders, fundamentalists, and rational agents can generate price dynamics displaying shortmomentum and long-term mean reversion. Lux (1998) Westerhoff and Reitz (2003) , Reitz and Westerhoff (2006) , and Manzan and Westerhoff (2007) introduce time variation in the impact of either chartists or fundamentalists conditional on the distance of the market price to the fundamental value. Frijns, Lehnert and Zwinkels (2010) demonstrate the added value of a heterogeneous agent model for volatility trading. In a recent contribution, Franke (2009) estimates a heterogeneous agent model using the simulated method of moments; Amilon (2008) also focuses on the methodological aspects of estimating HAMs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the heterogeneous agent model for the housing market. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology employed to estimate the model for the U.S. housing market. In addition, Section 3 introduces the fundamental house price, based on the present value of rents, used by fundamentalists. Section 4 subsequently presents the empirical results and Section 5 concludes the paper.
An Empirical Heterogeneous Agent Model for the Housing Market
We develop a simple and stylized heterogeneous agent model for the housing market, following Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990) , Frankel and Froot (1991) and Hommes (1997, 1998) and Dieci and Westerhoff (2009) . The model is not intended as a full-fledged asset pricing model; therefore, we do not consider the full micro foundation of behavior. The model rather represents emergent dynamics and serves as a sound foundation and interpretation for the time-varying coefficients of our econometric model of house price dynamics, estimated in Section 4 of the paper.
As in the model for the housing market of Dieci and Westerhoff (2009) the market is populated by three types of agents, namely consumers, constructors and investors. Consumers and investors are on the demand side of the market, while constructors are on the supply side. Consumers buy houses for the sole purpose of living.
We assume that the flow of aggregate consumer demand for housing (
the value of the house price index at time t:
where t is time measured in quarters and P t is the logarithm of the real house price index at time t. We expect b < 0, as higher prices should reduce the demand for housing.
Alternatively, higher house prices also have large wealth effects for most consumers, as a house typically represents a large fraction of household net worth (Stein, 1995) . Further, the majority of house sales are to repeat buyers (about 60%, see Stein 1995) , for whom a substantial portion of the down payment on a new home typically comes from the proceeds of the sales of the old home. The model of Stein (1995) shows that selfreinforcing effects can run from prices to down payments back to the demand for housing. These effects may reduce the price elasticity of the demand for housing.
Investors in our model are only interested in short-term capital gains and are not motivated by long-term rent income.. nvestors are boundedly rational in the way they form expectations. As in Frankel and Froot (1991) , investors choose among two forecasting rules for determining the expected return E(R t+1 ), called fundamentalist and chartist 4 . Return R t+1 is defined as the log-price change P t+1 -P t . The first rule, fundamentalist, is based on the expectation of mean reversion of the market price towards the long-term fundamental price. Their demand is given by
in which t F is the (log) fundamental price and α < 0 the speed of mean reversion. The second rule, which we call chartist, takes advantage of the stickiness of house prices (positive autocorrelation), documented by Case and Shiller (1989) . Their demand is given by:
in which β > 0 is the extrapolation parameter and L > 0 is a positive integer indicating the number of lags. Chartists expect past price changes to continue in the future and are therefore positive feedback traders.
Note that a demand for chartists and fundamentalists does not imply that speculators short-sell real estate. Instead, speculators are assumed to decrease their holdings of real instate in reaction to a negative expected return because demand is defined as a flow variable. In addition, the different agents in the model do not necessarily directly coincide with actual traders active on the market. The real and speculative demand can be thought of as different motives of a single individual for changing his or her holdings of real estate.
We assume that investors can switch between the two expectation formation rules based on historical forecasting performance, following Hommes (1997, 1998) . 5 A strong motivation for switching among forecasting rules can be found Frankel and Froot (1991) . Frankel and Froot (1991) To model the dependence of the weights on recent forecasting performance we use a logit switching rule, as introduced by Manski and McFadden (1982) and applied in Hommes (1997, 1998) , such that the weight of fundamentalists such that the investors are perfectly adaptive and W will always be equal to zero or one. Alternatively, 1/γ can be interpreted as the status quo bias of investors; see Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) . In this behavioral setting, investors adhere to their strategy even though objective measures indicate they should switch.
The functional form of (5) is somewhat different than usual as introduced by Hommes (1997, 1998) . Whereas Brock and Hommes consider the absolute performance difference, c t f t π π − , we consider the relative difference as in Ter Ellen and Zwinkels (2010) . As a result, the intensity of choice parameter γ is normalized and therefore comparable across time and markets. Second, because the relative performance measure is bounded between -1 and 1, the estimation process is smoother. This is especially important given the tremendous growth in house prices over time, causing the order of magnitude of forecast errors to change. 
in which K > 0 is an integer, and f t π and c t π denote the historical forecasting performance of the fundamentalists and chartists rules over the past K periods, respectively. Total demand by investors is then the weighted average demand of fundamentalists and chartists, and can be written as follows:
Apart from demand for housing by consumers and investors, constructors build new residential structures and sell them in the market. The new supply by constructers (S t ) depends positively on the value of the house price index at time t:
in which c > 0 and d > 0.
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The overall change in the log real house price is linearly dependent on excess demand plus a random noise term t
where f > 0 is a positive reaction parameter. Filling in the different elements from
equations (1) to (9) into (10) yields the following relation
The full model, finally, can be simplified without loss of generality to
in which the combined intercept is given by
, the consumers versus constructors price elasticity is ) (
, and the chartist's market impact is
We will later on estimate the heterogeneous agent model (12) empirically. In this model ' c is a constant. The coefficient ' d represents the sensitivity of the house price change to the current house price level, driven by the real demand and supply by consumers and constructers. We expect this coefficient to be negative (d' < 0), assuming b < 0 and d > 0, but the magnitude may depend on the size of the wealth and liquidity effects of higher house prices on demand described by Stein (1995) .
The coefficient ' α equals the speed of mean reversion parameter of the fundamentalists, scaled by a positive constant. We expect ' α to be negative; otherwise the fundamentalists do not expect the price to revert to its fundamental value. If ' α is between minus one and zero, then −1/ ' α (> 1) denotes the number of periods the price takes to revert to the fundamental value. The coefficient '
β is the past return extrapolation parameter of the chartists, scaled by a positive constant. We expect ' β to be positive for the chartists to be positive feedback traders exploiting the positive correlation in house price changes. The coefficient γ, finally, is the status quo bias or the sensitivity of investors to differences in forecast error. We expect γ to be positive for investors to switch towards the better performing strategy.
Our heterogeneous agent model belongs to the class of behavioral finance models. Barberis and Thaler (2003) note that behavioral finance builds on two main pillars:
psychology and limits to arbitrage; psychology is again subdivided into beliefs and preferences. All elements are represented in our model. First of all, the agents in the model are not rational. The beliefs, or expectations as we call them, are clearly boundedly rational. The fundamentalist and chartist rules are simple rules of thumb. Also, the groups do not take each other's existence into account when forming expectations. The preferences of investors are also not in line with traditional utility maximization principles. Investors apply a myopic risk-return tradeoff. Furthermore, their preferences suffer from behavioral biases; for example, the switching between rules is sluggish due to status quo bias. The existence of chartists in itself also points towards representativeness bias. Because of the switching mechanism, the notion of limits to arbitrage is embedded within the model. Typically, fundamentalists introduce mean-reverting dynamics into the market price of houses by pushing the price towards its equilibrium fundamental value.
However, when the price moves far away from the fundamental value due to the noise traders, fundamentalists are driven out of the market because of their relatively bad performance. As a consequence, the mean reverting force dissipates, allowing trend chasers to drive the price level far beyond its rent-based fundamental value. The behavioral heterogeneous agent model for the housing market therefore directly relates behavioral characteristics of traders at the micro level to the resulting market price at the macro level. The interaction between boundedly rational traders can generate boom-bust cycles in the housing market, as we will show in Section 4.
The next section discusses the data and methodology used to estimate the model.
In addition, we introduce the rent-based fundamental price used by fundamentalists.
Data and Methodology

Data sources
We will estimate the model using quarterly time-series data on prices and rents for the aggregate stock of owner-occupied housing in the United States developed by Davis, Lehnert and Martin (2008) and made available by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Index value. 8 All data is deflated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Fundamental value estimate
7 Data located at "Land and Property Values in the U.S.", Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, http://www.lincolninst.edu/resources/ 8 The S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index is published quarterly with a two-month lag. New levels are released at 9am Eastern Standard Time on the last Tuesday of the 2 nd month after the end of the quarter. The underlying data for rents is based on 'the rent of primary residence' series, published monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which is published within three weeks after the end of the month.
The expectation formation rule of the fundamentalists requires a fundamental value estimate t F for the U.S. house price index. The real estate literature broadly poses two methods for calculating a fundamental real estate price. Both methods are based on the notion that the total return to housing, to speak in financial market terms, is the sum of the expected capital gain plus the dividend yield from owning a house. They differ, however, in how to calculate the dividend yield part. Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005) advocate the use of the so-called user cost of housing. This measure consists of a broad range of factors that affect the cost of living relevant to the owner, such as mortgage rates, taxes, and maintenance costs. Hott and Monnin (2008) , on the other hand, theoretically show that there should be no arbitrage possible between renting and buying in equilibrium. As a result, the user cost of housing should be equal to the rental rate, such that the fundamental house price can be represented as the present value of all expected future rent payments.
Given that the fundamental price is a benchmark for investors in our model who do not intend to live in the house but keep it for the sole purpose of monetary profits, we proceed in constructing a fundamental price based on rents (instead of the user cost of housing). Hott and Monnin (2008) define the fundamental price as
where H t is the rent in period t, δ is the rate of depreciation of the house, and DR t the discount rate, consisting of the mortgage rate, maintenance costs, and a risk premium. Now suppose that rents increase at a fixed rate g per period and that the mortgage rate is constant. The former assumption is motivated by the fact that rents are typically indexed, while the rate of inflation is targeted at a constant level in the long run by the Federal Reserve. The latter assumption follows from the observation that home buyers tend to use fixed-rate mortgages. As a result, Equation (13) reduces to
Within the no-arbitrage framework of Hott and Monnin (2008) , the discount rate of rents DR is equal to the unconditional expected return to housing. The expected return to housing consists of the expected return due to capital gains after depreciation, plus the
). Equilibrium implies that the long-run rate of capital gains after depreciation is equal to the adjusted growth rate of rents g'. This implies
, and our final expression for the fundamental house price reduces to 3.3. Descriptive statistics Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the data used for the estimation of the model.
The descriptive statistics confirm the image arising from Figure 1 . The U.S. national house price index is on average above its fundamental value (the difference is statistically significant, with t-statistic 8.06), which is mainly due to the latter part of the sample . Quarterly changes in the house price index display high positive autocorrelation at lags of 1 to 4 quarters and significantly negative autocorrelation at lags of 3 to 5 years, confirming the mean reversion pattern found by Case and Shiller (1990) and Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1991) .
Price changes are twice as volatile as fundamental value changes, confirming the excess volatility puzzle in the housing market noted by Shiller (1981 performance. The optimal number of lags investors use in their switching decision, K, as well as the optimal number of lagged returns used by chartists, L, is calibrated using the Box-Jenkins methodology.
We check the robustness of the results by also estimating the model without the recent bubble period, using only data from 1961 until 1994. In addition, we estimate an alternative model with the coefficient d' restricted to zero (d' = 0). In this model we effectively assume that the demand by consumers and supply by constructors are always in balance, t C t S D = , and that the marginal demand by investors drives housing prices. 10 Results are not shown in the table. The p-value for the null hypothesis of no cointegrating relation is 0.000, while the p-value for the null hypothesis of at most one cointegrating relation is 0.732, based on a VAR model with three lags estimated in the period 1961Q2 until 2009Q1. 11 Estimating the unconditional weight as a free parameter in the constant weight case is not possible as it would only serve as a scaling parameter. As such, the weight parameter would not be identified.
Alternatively, consumers and constructors can be thought of as being a part of the speculator group. As shown by Gorton (2009) , residential home owners in the sub prime market effectively behaved as speculators, or chartists, as the only way to afford their home was to speculate on capital gains. Furthermore, individuals choosing between the substitutes of renting and buying, based on the arbitrage argument put forward in Hott and Monnin (2008) , are behaving as fundamentalists since the fundamental price is based on rents. The fundamentalist and chartist rules may consequently capture the net effect of a larger number of different market participants. The empirical advantage of the restricted model is that it does not include the non-stationary variable P t as an explanatory variable, which may otherwise lead to biased estimates and incorrect statistical inference.
The next section presents the estimation results of the heterogeneous agent model for the U.S. housing market. Table 2 presents the in-sample estimation results. Table 2 Here ________________ The first column in Table 2 shows the estimation results over the full sample period, for a model without switching between chartists and fundamentalists (the weights are 50%). The coefficient for the current house price on the change in price, d', is positive and significant. This suggests that the price elasticity of supply is relatively low, while wealth and liquidity effects push up the demand for houses by existing home owners when prices rise, as described in Stein (1995) . The investors' coefficients ' α and ' β are highly significant and carry the expected signs. The estimated (scaled) mean reversion parameter ' α is negative, indicating that fundamentalists expect the house price to return to the fundamental value. The effect size indicates that fundamentalists expect the market price to return to its fundamental value in 1/(0.1080/2) = 18.5 periods, i.e. 4.6 years 12 . The optimal number of lags for the chartist rule is L = 4. The estimated (scaled) past return extrapolation parameter ' β is positive, confirming that chartists are positive feedback traders who extrapolate previous price changes. The effect size implies that chartists expect 53.4/2 = 27% of last year's price change to continue in the next quarter.
Results
In-sample estimation results
_________________ Insert
The second column of Table 2 shows the results for the model that allows switching among the chartist and fundamentalist forecasting rules. The positive sign and the significance of the intensity of choice parameter γ (p-value < 0.01) implies that investors switch towards the better performing forecast rule, based on its past performance. 13 The optimal number of lags for measuring past performance is K = 2.
That is, if fundamentalists (chartists) have a more accurate price forecast in period t and t-1, more investors will follow the fundamentalist (chartist) expectation formation rule in period t+1. The added value of switching is further illustrated by the significant increase of the log-likelihood value. The other estimates in the second column are comparable to those in the first column; the fundamentalists' speed of mean reversion is somewhat larger while the chartists' extrapolation is somewhat smaller. This is caused by the fact that the average fundamentalist weight W is below 0.5, as will be shown in Figure 3 .
The third column shows estimation results for the model with switching, but with the coefficient for the lagged house price restricted to zero (d' = 0). In this model the demand by investors drives housing prices, while we assume that the demand of consumers is always met by the supply of constructors, t C t S D = . An empirical advantage of this model is that it does not include the non-stationary exploratory variable P t , which may otherwise give rise to biased estimates.
14 The results show that the coefficient estimates for the chartist and fundamentalist rules are not much affected by the inclusion or exclusion of P t . The switching parameter is somewhat higher, while model fit deteriorates only slightly. 12 We divide the coefficient by two because of the (constant) weight of 0.5. 13 The order of magnitude of γ cannot be interpreted as it is conditional on the functional form of the performance measure π. 14 As P and F are cointegrated, the term (P -F) is stationary and does not cause similar problems. Further, if we add a coefficient b F for F in the cointegration relation in Equation (12), i.e. (P -b F F), the coefficient estimate is not significantly different from 1 in all model specifications in Table 2 . This initial decline is caused by the extreme overvaluation. The large overvaluation implies that fundamentalists also expect a large drop in price, due to Equation (3). If this does not materialize, or at least not in the order of magnitude that fundamentalists expect, chartists temporarily gain momentum because they start to extrapolate the negative price trend. When price comes closer to its fundamental, fundamentalists' expectation does materialize and they start dominating the market. spread between the minimum and maximum, though, indicates that the market is never fully dominated by either group of investors. The autocorrelation of the series W, 0.81, indicates that the weight is fairly stable; agents do not quickly change their strategy, suggesting a relatively high status quo bias.
Investor weights
Endogenous Dynamics
To learn more about the behavior of agents in our model, we simulate house prices by generating a sequence of price changes from the behavioral heterogeneous agent model with switching, using the parameter set as estimated for the full sample. The log-real fundamental price is set equal to 10 and kept constant. Figure 4 shows the limiting behavior of the log price P and the fundamentalist weight W of the simulation process.
Interestingly, Panel (A) of Figure 4 shows that irrespective of the starting values, the model does not converge to a stable point, as is usually the case in economic models, but to a stable limit cycle 16 . Under the estimated set of coefficients the model is situated beyond the first bifurcation point, but before the chaotic region of price movements. This can be seen from the fact that the model does not converge to a stable point, but also not to chaos 17 . In other words, the calibrated heterogeneous agent model generates regular boom and bust price cycles. Prices regularly oscillate between just below the fundamental value of 9.993, and the upper limit of 10.154; because these are log-prices, the cycle constitutes a non-negligible range of over 16%. Fundamentalists bring the price back to the fundamental value, after which the price is pushed upwards again by the real side of the market (coefficient d') and extrapolated by chartists. As such, the fraction of fundamentalists in the market ranges from 0.296 to 0.732. A full cycle takes 42 periods, which corresponds to 10.5 years. The cycle does not oscillate symmetrically around the fundamental value due to the intercept in the empirical model plus the upward pressure of the real players in the market.
_________________
16 Using P = F =10 as starting values, the model directly sets off in the limit cycle. 17 An extended study into the deterministic skeleton is out of the scope of this paper. For more details on the deterministic behavior of a similar model, we refer to Dieci and Westerhoff (2010) Insert Figure the difference between the actual house price index and its fundamental value based on rents to make forecasts, as well as lagged price changes and lagged fundamental value changes. The ARIMA model does not use fundamental values and purely exploits the 18 We did not attempt to align the timing of peaks and troughs; the simulated price path is regular.
(partial) autocorrelation pattern of the historical house price returns. The best fitting ARIMA model in the in-sample period is an ARIMA(4,0,0) model, which is subsequently used to generate out-of-sample forecasts.
Forecasts are created using an expanding window. That is, each model is first estimated on the sample 1962Q1-2000Q4. 19 Subsequently, prices are forecasted up to one year ahead depending on the forecast horizon, which we vary from 1 to 4 quarters.
20
The models are then re-estimated on the expanded sample 1962Q1-2001Q1, and a new set of forecasts is generated. This process is repeated and eventually results in 30 out-ofsample forecasts. Table 3 shows the out-of-sample forecasts made by the models for a horizon of one quarter, and compares them to the actual change in the log real house price and the fundamental value.
_________________
Insert Table 3 Here _________________ Table 3 . We do not want to celebrate the success of these forecasts after the fact.
Still, it is very interesting to see that relatively simple econometric models, even a plain time-series model using only the last four lagged returns, could have predicted the big turnaround in the U.S. housing market in the beginning of 2006 and the large nominal price declines that followed.
The difference in forecasting accuracy between the models is assessed using the ratio of the average forecasting accuracy of the HAM over the average forecasting 19 Results are qualitatively insensitive to this choice of sample period. 20 When forecasting more than one period ahead the fundamental value is held constant (equal to the last in-sample observation), such that there is no informational advantage.
accuracy of the alternative models. A ratio less than one implies better performance for the HAM. Forecast performance is measured using the mean error, mean absolute error, and mean squared error. Table 4 presents these forecast performance ratios, and corresponding t-statistics (see Diebold and Mariano, 1995) using a rectangular lag window with k-1 sample auto-covariances for the k-step ahead forecast error.
Insert Table 4 Here
The results in Table 4 show that the HAM forecasts are most accurate: all ratios are below one, apart from the VECM at a horizon of one quarter using MAE. The advantage of the HAM versus the benchmark models generally increases as the forecast horizon increases. The difference is typically significant compared to the VECM (apart from the 1-quarter horizon). Compared to the ARIMA model, the difference is of similar magnitude, but mostly insignificant, although the t-statistic is typically well above one.
In Tables 5 and 6 we provide additional evidence of the forecasting power of the HAM. Table 5 presents results of a biasedness and efficiency test of the forecasts. That is, we estimate the equation Table 6 Here _________________ The results in Table 5 show that the forecasts of the HAM are unbiased and efficient for all forecast horizons. The same can be said for both the VECM and the ARIMA model. However, the adjusted R 2 of the efficiency equation is notably higher for the HAM than the benchmark models. 
The model with the most informative forecasts will have significant β's. The results in Table 6 are again in favor of the HAM for all four forecast horizons. The forecast of the HAM is the only one that yields a significant β. Moreover, the adjusted R 2 's in Table 6 are not notably higher compared to those for the HAM in Table 5 . Therefore, the forecasts of the VECM and ARMA models do not seem to contain any information not incorporated in the HAM forecasts.
Conclusions
The unprecedented rise and decline in the U.S. housing market in the last decade is broadly viewed as the trigger for the global credit crisis. In addition, an increasing amount of evidence is building that market participants do not always act rationally in the traditional definition. In this paper we develop and estimate a parsimonious behavioural model for the U.S. housing market with boundedly rational participants. It relates agents with behavioural characteristics at the micro level to the resulting evolution of the market price of houses at the macro level. In our model the market is driven by consumers, constructors and speculative investors. Investors in the housing market use two simple rules of thumb for forming expectations about future house prices: fundamentalist and chartist. The fundamentalist rule predicts that the house price will return to its fundamental value based on rents, while the chartist rule simply extrapolates recent house price changes. Furthermore, investors are allowed to switch between rules conditional on past performance, although they suffer from status quo bias and thus adhere too long to a losing strategy.
To estimate the model, we first derive a fundamental value estimate for the aggregate U.S. housing market, represented by the Case-Shiller index, using data on rents. We show that the U.S. house price index has a long-term cointegration relation with the rent-based fundamental value. We then estimate the behavioural heterogeneous agent model and find that both the chartist rule and the fundamentalist rule explain actual At the most basic level, the model for the housing market put forward in this paper can be interpreted as follows: the expected change in house prices is driven by two main components, positive autocorrelation in price changes and reversion of the price index to its long-term fundamental value based on rents. The relative importance of these two expected return components varies over time, depending on the recent performance of the two forecasting rules. Empirically this model with dynamic weights fits the data well, providing more accurate out-of-sample forecasts than competing vector error correction and ARIMA time-series models. In addition, our paper provides an economic interpretation for this empirical model in a heterogeneous agent framework with positive feedback traders and traders that expect the price to mean revert to its fundamental value. Notes: Figure 2 displays the evolution and characteristics of the weight W t , the fraction of investors using the fundamentalist forecasting rule. The chartist weight is equal to (1-W t ). Panel (A) presents the time-series of weight W t and the price misalignment P t -F t . Panel (B) shows a scatter plot of the fundamentalist weight W t versus ) /( ) ( Figure 3 displays the simulated behavior of the log real house price index P and the weight of investors using the fundamentalist forecasting rule (W), using the estimated model parameters (full sample period). The fundamental value F is fixed at the value 10. Panel (A) displays the time series behavior of P and W; Panel (B) compares the actual to the simulated price deviation from the fundamental value; Panel (C) displays the phase plot of P t versus P t-1 ; and Panel (D) the scatter of P versus W. 197 196 196 195 196 Notes: Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the U.S. log real house price index P, the change in price ∆P, the log real fundamental value F based on rents, the change in fundamental value ∆F, and the deviation between the log-real price level and the fundamental value (P -F). Rows denoted 'Auto-corr. Q(-k)' display the autocorrelation of the series at quarterly lag k. Notes: Table 2 presents in-sample estimation results of the heterogeneous agent model, specified by Equation (12). Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates; LL is the log likelihood of the model and AIC denotes the Akaike information criterion. For the full switching model (1), 2∆LL denotes the difference in log likelihood compared to the static model without switching (γ = 0). For switching model (2) with d'=0, 2∆LL denotes the difference in log likelihood compared to the full switching model (1). * , ** , *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Table 4 shows ratio of the forecast error of the heterogeneous agent model (HAM) over the forecast error of the competing vector error correction model (VECM) and the ARIMA(4,0,0) model (denoted by ARMA); a number < 1 therefore represents better performance by the HAM. 'ME' is mean error; 'MAE' mean absolute error, and 'MSE' mean squared error. Diebold-Mariano t-statistics are reported in parentheses; * , ** , *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. * , ** , *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The column Wald depicts the p-value for the Wald-test testing the joint null hypothesis α = 0 and β = 1. 
